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Reflecting on negative emotional experiences can be adaptive but it can also maintain or 
intensify detrimental emotional states. Which factors determine whether reflection can 
have one consequence or another is unclear. This study focused on two research programs 
that have concentrated on this topic in the last decades: processing-mode theory (PMT) 
and self-distancing theory (SDT). The article described and contrasted both programs 
and their findings. The promising results that PMT and SDT have achieved in identifying 
the differences between the forms of adaptive and maladaptive reflection are highlighted. 
Likewise, the disconcerting contradictions observed between both programs that make 
integrating the findings difficult are indicated. The PMT states that adaptive reflection is 
concrete, and it is focused on the how of the experience. The SDT states that adaptive 
reflection is self-distanced and focused on the global meaning of the experience. The 
article finishes by indicating possible explanations for these apparent contradictions and 
outlines the challenges to be solved to improve comprehension of the topic.
Keywords: reflection, rumination, negative emotional experiences, processing-mode theory, theory of 
self-distancing reflection
INTRODUCTION
Reflecting on experiences that imply emotional discomfort, sadness, or psychological pain 
(hereinafter “negative emotional experiences”) is a form of usual self-reflection and, to some 
degree, almost unavoidable. Notably, reflecting is usually necessary for properly processing 
vital experiences (Stanton and Low, 2012). By contrast, attempting to suppress or avoid thinking 
about negative emotional experiences is frequently self-defeating (Webb et  al., 2012).
Many psychotherapeutic practices with proven effectiveness are supported and favor reflection 
on negative emotional experiences (Greenberg, 2017). Writing about negative emotional experiences 
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is a process that implies reflection and has been shown to 
be  positively related to better adaptation (Frattaroli, 2006; Hoyt 
et al., 2016). Some forms of reflection (e.g., “deliberate rumination”) 
have been shown to favor learning and “post-traumatic growth” 
processes after adverse experiences (Garcia et al., 2016). However, 
diverse research has shown that reflection on negative emotional 
experiences can also have detrimental effects and maintain or 
intensify negative emotional states (Mor and Winquist, 2002; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). This apparent paradox has resulted 
in attempts to differentiate forms of self-focus and adaptive and 
maladaptive self-reflection with no clarity until now (Trapnell 
and Campbell, 1999; Siegle et  al., 2004; Watkins, 2008;  
Kross and Ayduk, 2017; Nakajima et  al., 2018).
The reflection on negative emotional experiences can 
be  understood as one of many forms of repetitive thinking. 
Repetitive thinking corresponds to a broad and encompassing 
term proposed by Watkins (2008) to refer to different process 
forms of prolonged or recurrent thought about one’s self, 
concerns, and experiences. A wide variety of terms are available 
for forms of repetitive thought, and it is not always clear 
whether these terms refer to different processes or are different 
names of analogous processes (Webb et  al., 2012). Examples 
of these terms include rumination (with various acceptations), 
cognitive and emotional processing, perspective-taking, 
simulation and mental imagery, preoccupation, problem-solving, 
and reassessment. These terms have different degrees of 
conceptual overlap with self-reflection.
The study of the reflection on negative emotional experiences, 
and expressly using this term, has been mainly developed in the 
context of response styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema et  al., 2008). 
Although this theory focuses on rumination, regarding development, 
it distinguishes two rumination components: a reflection component 
(pondering reflection) and a more self-judging component 
(brooding) (Treynor et  al., 2003). In this perspective, rumination 
is understood as “a mode of responding to distress that involves 
repetitively and passively focusing on symptoms of distress and 
on the possible causes and consequences of these symptoms” 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et  al., 2008, p.  400). This form of rumination 
has been called “depressive rumination” (Papageorgiou and Wells, 
2004), and it is generally understood as focusing on the thought 
of the emotional discomfort experience and the events and 
situations related to those discomfort states (Watkins, 2004, p. 6).
Depressive rumination has been shown to be  a predictor of 
different negative consequences for individuals, increasing emotional 
discomfort, and appears as a risk factor for diverse mental disorders 
(Trick et  al., 2016). The pondering reflection component was 
defined as “a purposeful turning inward to engage in cognitive 
problem solving to alleviate one’s depressive symptoms” (Treynor 
et  al., 2003, p.  256), whereas brooding was defined as “a passive 
comparison of one’s current situation with some unachieved 
standard” (Treynor et  al., 2003, p.  256), implying more self-
deprecating and regretting components. Diverse research has 
shown that the clearly negative component of rumination is 
brooding (Joormann et  al., 2006; Chan et  al., 2009; Cova et  al., 
2009; Cox et  al., 2012; Romero et  al., 2014; Xavier et  al., 2016).
Although the distinction between reflecting and brooding 
is useful to suggest clues about the aspects that would differentiate 
more adaptive and maladaptive thought processes of negative 
emotional experiences, the literature has shown that is insufficient 
for a broader clarification of these differences. Notably, pondering 
reflection does not show relations with positive adaptation 
processes like post-traumatic growth (García et  al., 2017), and 
in some studies, it has been shown to be a maladaptive process, 
but not at the brooding level (Miranda and Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2007; Gooding et al., 2012; Hasegawa et al., 2013). The research 
into the topic has been limited by the scarce conceptual 
elaboration regarding what is pondering reflection (and by the 
limitations of the scale used to measure it) (Rude et  al., 2007). 
Thus, the developments of the response styles theory allow it 
to show that in a case where the rumination takes the form 
of brooding, it is clearly maladaptive, but they do not allow 
for the identification of whether there is another form of 
thinking of negative emotional experiences other than brooding 
that can be  necessary or beneficial. Thus, although the term 
rumination is used to refer to a maladaptive form of thinking 
on negative emotional experiences, it is rather brooding and 
their analogous processes the ones that have that profile. 
Reflection and rumination may be  considered as broad terms 
and synonyms to refer to the focus of thinking on negative 
events and emotional experiences, where processes that can 
be  adaptive or maladaptive coexist.
The study on the types of reflection about negative emotional 
experiences can be  placed in a broader context of research on 
coping strategies for adverse events, emotional regulation, and 
cognitive and emotional processing. One of the most relevant 
challenges has been the attempt to differentiate those strategies 
and processes that seem, in general, more adaptive and less 
adaptive (Páez and Costa, 2014). The meta-analysis presented 
by Webb et  al. (2012) identified reappraisal as the emotional 
regulation strategy with the highest positive effect (specifically, 
reappraisal in the form of perspective-taking, although, reappraisal 
of the answer – analogous to acceptance – and reappraisal of 
the emotional stimuli also showed positive effects). Likewise, 
diversion from and suppression of the emotional expression 
showed positive effects. Whereas, focusing on the emotion (e.g., 
“let yourself feel the event as if you  were there”) as well as 
on the causes and implications of the events (e.g., “think about 
why you react the way you do”) showed negative effects. Another 
meta-analysis of the relation between emotion-regulation strategies 
and psychopathology showed that reappraisal and acceptance 
have an adaptive role; in contrast, rumination, suppression, and 
avoidance have a maladaptive one (Aldao et  al., 2010). These 
meta-analyses have not considered strategies such as problem-
solving and mindfulness, which have also shown to be  useful 
in reducing the impact of negative events (Schäfer et  al., 2017; 
Iani et  al., 2019).
These generalizations of the adaptive or maladaptive value 
of coping and emotion-regulation strategies must be taken with 
caution since this judgment depends on various factors, such 
as individual differences and the moment and context in which 
strategies are used (Naragon-Gainey et  al., 2017). However, 
these generalizations allow an approximation to comprehend 
which strategies are, in general, more useful for people when 
facing negative events and emotions.
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The purpose of this article is to conduct a conceptual analysis 
of two intensive and extensive research programs which focus 
specifically on reflection on adaptive and maladaptive processes. 
One program is based on the processing-mode theory, PMT 
(the main author is E. Watkins), and the other on the theorization 
of the self-distanced analysis, self-distancing theory, SDT (the 
main authors are Ayduk and Kross). These are broad research 
programs that have provided solid empirical evidence to support 
their proposals (Watkins, 2008, 2016; Kross and Ayduk, 2017; 
Ayduk and Kross, 2018, for thorough reviews). A review of the 
publications related to PMT and SDT was carried out. The 
reviews made by the authors of both theories were used as the 
initial source for the current study. Moreover, literature searches 
in the electronic data bases of PsycINFO, Web of Science, and 
Scopus were carried out using “concrete rumination,” “abstract 
rumination,” “processing mode,” “self-distance,” and “self-
immersion” as keywords (from 2005 to 2019). Articles and books 
of interest cited in the reviewed publications were also considered.
In this paper, we  mainly focused on the most important 
findings of each program and the description and analysis of 
their similarities and differences. Few publications were found 
regarding the relations between both lines of research (Kross 
and Ayduk, 2008; Rude et  al., 2011). We  considered this 
surprising due to the importance of both programs and their 
mutual implications.
E. WATKINS’ PROGRAM: PROCESSING-
MODE THEORY
Watkins (2004, 2008, 2013, 2016) made a great effort to distinguish 
adaptive repetitive thought forms from maladaptive repetitive 
thought forms. He  proposed three factors that would be  crucial 
in the distinction between adaptive and maladaptive forms of 
repetitive thought: (1) the content of the thought, (2) factors 
of the intrapersonal and interpersonal context where this occurs, 
and (3) the processing mode (Watkins, 2008). The forms of 
repetitive thought whose contents are negative aspects of the 
experiences and about oneself are subject to an increased risk 
of being detrimental, although that does not exclude that certain 
forms of thought of negative emotional experiences could 
be  adaptive. That would depend on the intrapersonal and 
interpersonal context where they are performed and the 
processing mode.
Intrapersonal and interpersonal contexts may affect thought 
processes. The influence of the intrapersonal context is illustrated 
by the difference between thinking of negative emotional experiences 
and being a person who has high or low self-esteem. The same 
occurs in the interpersonal sphere, for example, an analysis of 
an experience in a vital situation of high or low stress will differ.
Concerning the PMT, it distinguishes abstract and concrete 
processing modes using the construal level theory (Trope and 
Liberman, 2003). “An abstract processing mode is conceptualized 
as focusing on general, superordinate, and decontextualized 
mental representations that convey the essential meaning, causes, 
and implications of goals and events (…)” (Watkins, 2016, 
p. 388). Although this abstract mode provides stability to goals 
and representations, the abstract mode makes an individual 
less responsive to the context and provides merely a few specific 
guidelines for the action; then, the opposite occurs in a concrete 
level of construct. Although these two thought-processing 
modes are necessary for individuals, the use of one or the 
other to reflect on negative emotional experiences would have 
different implications.
Abstract Reflection or Rumination
This form of repetitive thought implies an analytical and evaluative 
process focused on the comprehension of the causes of an 
event and its consequences. In a case when this form of repetitive 
thought is used to analyze negative emotional experiences, it 
would be  maladaptive. Schematically, this form of repetitive 
thought focuses on questions related to the why (e.g., “Why 
did it happen?”), that is, a question that would direct attention 
toward the abstract evaluation of the experiences and situations 
lived and favor the probability that the individual adopts a 
global and negative explanatory style and persistently thinks 
about her/his problems in this manner (Bassanini et  al., 2014).
Concrete Reflection or Rumination
This form of repetitive thought implies a processing mode focused 
on specific and contextual detail, direct experience in the present 
moment, and the process of how things happen. The thought 
is organized around questions based on the “how” of the experience 
lived, and not the “why” (Watkins et  al., 2008). By being more 
concrete and focused in the process, it would be  also more 
directed to the search for solutions (Watkins and Moulds, 2005). 
It would be  a form of adaptive reflection. “Focus on the direct, 
specific, and contextualized experience of an event, and on the 
details of goals, events, and actions that denote the feasibility, 
mechanics, and means of how to do the action” (Watkins, 2016, 
p.  30). “This functional counterpart is often focused on finding 
an active, concrete and immediate solution” (e.g., “How could 
I  cope with this problem?”) (Bassanini et  al., 2014, p.  19).
Watkins’ conceptualization of concrete rumination implicitly 
integrated two different components: one more experiential and 
the other more cognitive problem-solving oriented. Sometimes, 
he  characterizes it by its experiential aspect, for example, when 
he  describes that it implies an individual should “focus attention 
on the experience of feelings, mood, and symptoms” (Watkins 
et  al., 2008). One statement that induces concrete rumination is 
as follows: “I would like you  to focus on how it happened, and 
to imagine in your mind as vividly and concretely as possible a 
‘movie’ of how this event unfolded” (Watkins et al., 2008, p. 366). 
At other time, the author characterizes it more as a process where 
a situation is analyzed in detail, including how to manage it 
(Watkins, 2016). This second aspect is considered in one of the 
standardized procedures developed to assess concrete rumination, 
for example. In this procedure, individuals must state which 
relation they identify, between their own thought modes, when 
facing a negative event and the one shown by a comic-strip 
character. In the comic strips in which the character concretely 
processes, her/his thoughts are “How unlucky I  am! How can 
I  handle this, now? Which is the best solutions I  can get? What 
if G was in this situation? The best thing I  can do is minimize 
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the delay, which alternative strategies can I use?” (Bassanini et al., 
2014, p.  20). This comic strip shows a way of understanding the 
concrete rumination very closed to what it would be  problem-
focused coping and with no “experiential” component.
There are two complementary lines of evidence for the PMT. 
The first is the experimental research about the effects of 
inducing the two forms of thought. Instructing the individuals 
to engage in concrete rumination produced a faster recovery 
from negative effects and reduced intrusions after a previous 
negative induction (Watkins, 2004; Watkins et al., 2008; Ehring 
et  al., 2009). Stimulating concrete rumination in individuals 
with a diagnosis of depressive disorder reduces their negative 
global judgment (Rimes and Watkins, 2005) and increases their 
skills for problem-solving (Watkins and Moulds, 2005) and 
the specificity of their recalls (Watkins and Teasdale, 2001). 
By contrast, the analysis of the causes and meanings of their 
experience increases overgeneralization, avoids problem-solving, 
and increases depressive mood (Watkins, 2016).
The second line of evidence has been the development of 
depression treatment and prevention programs focused on the 
modification of the abstract processing, and an increase in the 
concrete processing mode. In the clinical trials performed, the 
training in “concrete rumination” has been shown to be effective 
in reducing abstract rumination such as depressive and anxious 
symptoms and disorders (Watkins and Moulds, 2007;  
Watkins et  al., 2009, 2011, 2012; Topper et  al., 2017).
O. AYDUK AND E. KROSS’ PROGRAM: 
SELF-DISTANCING THEORY
This line of research was originally based on the distinction 
between cold and hot processing forms and the concept of 
“psychological distance” (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Kross et al., 
2005). In this proposal, hot representations elicit reflective processing 
that is predominantly under stimulus control, leading to automatic 
approach and avoidance behaviors, whereas, cool representations, 
cognitively driven, reflect processing that is more effortful and 
is instrumental in inhibiting automatic responses activated by hot 
representations. From these initial conceptualizations, the authors 
proposed the existence of two differentiating dimensions of the 
reflection about negative emotional experiences: (1) the type of 
perspective about the self from which the experience is analyzed 
and (2) its content. Regarding the type of perspective, they made 
a distinction between a self-immersed analysis and a self-distanced 
analysis. By self-distancing, authors understand a means to get 
close to their experience as an external observer. There are different 
modes in which this distancing can be  experienced, for example, 
visually (seeing yourself from the outside) and how to refer to 
the experience or oneself (in third person).
More recently, authors have been exploring how the temporal 
perspective from which the experience is “observed” (e.g., from 
the future) can also imply distancing (Bruehlman-Senecal and 
Ayduk, 2015; Kross and Ayduk, 2017; Ranney et  al., 2017), 
whereas the self-immersed analysis implies that the individual 
experiences the emotions and events again as they happened 
from a first-person perspective. Regarding the content of the 
thoughts, they distinguish an orientation toward the emotional 
experience (focus on the “how”) or toward the analysis of the 
experience (focus on the “why”). In the analysis conducted 
by Ayduk and Kross, the type of perspective and the content 
are related because asking yourself the why of the experience 
would ease a distanced perspective, and the attention to the 
how would ease self-immersion. From this model, the adaptive 
reflection is self-distanced and focused on the why. In that 
sense, a deciding factor is not whether the attention is put 
on the “why” or to the “how” but whether the reflection is 
self-distancing. We  must emphasize that the attention to the 
why, however, is not accessory: the search for explanations 
for the negative experiences is, from the authors’ point of 
view, an epistemic need of human beings; therefore, performing 
it in an adaptive way is crucial (Ayduk and Kross, 2018).
Another aspect we  want to highlight is the distinction the 
authors made between the self-distancing of negative emotional 
experiences pure and simple, which can have various purposes 
and uses, and the self-distanced analysis, which implies directing 
the cognitive process to the analysis of the experiences (Kross 
et  al., 2012). In some cases, pure and simple self-distancing 
can be  negative, for example, when it is a chronic form of 
avoidance. The authors emphasize that the self-distanced analysis 
of the experience is what is adaptive and not the distancing 
per se. Self-distancing reflection would allow a modification 
of the experience, which stops being recalled time after time 
because its reconstruction has been allowed, easing the feeling 
of insight and closing (Kross and Ayduk, 2008).
Studies of natural patterns of the use of self-immersion and 
self-distancing, as well as experimental studies, have shown that 
self-distanced reflection is more adaptive: less negative emotional 
activation immediately and in follow-ups, less depressive rumination, 
and more positive physiological responses such as lower levels 
of blood pressure (Ayduk and Kross, 2008, 2010; Kross and 
Ayduk, 2008). Studies of individuals with depressive symptomatology 
and individuals with a diagnosis of major depressive disorder 
have shown similar outcomes (Kross and Ayduk, 2009; Kross 
et  al., 2012). Recently, studies of the efficacy of the training in 
self-distancing reflection have been developed, with promissory 
results in the expected direction (Penner et  al., 2016; Orvell 
et al., 2017). Indirect support to these authors’ approaches comes 
from the results of the meta-analysis presented by Webb et  al. 
(2012), where reappraisal via perspective-taking appears as the 
form of emotion-regulation with the highest adaptive value. This 
view of reappraisal is very close to the self-distanced analysis 
(e.g., “increase your sense of objective distance, viewing pictured 
event from a detached third-person perspective”).
CONTRAST BETWEEN THE RESEARCH 
PROGRAMS
We observed that both research programs have the same interest 
in identifying adaptive reflection forms and differentiate them 
from what would be  a non-adaptive form of reflection. In this 
context, both programs coincide in identifying brooding as a 
Cova et al. Adaptive Reflection on Negative Emotional Experiences
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 September 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1943
clearly maladaptive form of rumination. However, the reasons 
for that are somehow different: for PMT, the reason is the 
abstract nature, superordinate, of the focus of the thought in 
the negative emotional experience, which would be the maladaptive 
factor of brooding because it leads to despairing and self-critical 
generalizations of the events and blocks the search for solutions. 
For SDT, the maladaptive aspect of brooding is the absence of 
self-distancing when thinking of negative emotional experiences 
because that favors the “emotional overflow” and avoids the 
processing and reconstruction of the experience.
Differences between PMT and SDT are even clearer at the 
moment of analyzing how adaptive reflection is conceptualized. 
Terms used in each program are eloquent in this regard: PMT 
identifies adaptive reflection with the analysis of the “how” of 
the experience and not the “why,” unlike SDT. For SDT, a 
more abstract and comprehensive analysis of the experience, 
provided that it is self-distancing, is more adaptive (although 
Ayduk and Kross initially described adaptive reflection as 
abstract, they decided later to avoid this term because they 
concluded that there would be  non-adaptive, self-immersed, 
and other adaptive, self-distancing abstract processing modes; 
Kross et  al., 2012). For PMT, the abstract processing of the 
negative emotional experience is always maladaptive. For PMT, 
the risk of thinking from the “why” regarding the negative 
emotional experiences is that it would reduce the activity and 
the search for solutions (Watkins, 2016). However, for SDT, 
thinking from the why is a facilitator of the negative emotional 
experience reconstruction to the extent that it favors self-
distancing but recognizes that there can be  an analysis of the 
why from the self-immersed perspective, which would 
be  maladaptive and typical of brooding (Kross et  al., 2012).
These differences between both programs, regarding the 
value of the abstraction and the analysis of “why” and “how” 
of negative emotional experiences, are reflected in how both 
use the construal level theory. SDT (Kross and Ayduk, 2017) 
considers that a high construal level, when analyzing negative 
emotional experiences, is positive because it favors psychological 
distance. PMT, by contrast, considers that a high construal 
level processing, when analyzing negative emotional experiences, 
is characteristic of maladaptive rumination (Watkins, 2008).
The authors of both research programs have not contrasted 
their proposals. Watkins (2008) has stated only that there are 
no analogies between the PMT and SDT concepts because 
PMT would refer to the differences in the construal levels of 
concrete and abstract rumination and SDT would refer to 
cold and hot processing, which would be  at another analysis 
level. However, this observation made by Watkins is debatable: 
the relation between self-distanced analysis and cold processing, 
and self-immersed analysis and hot processing, was merely 
the origin of Ayduk and Kross’ conceptualization. Notably, 
these authors no longer use the terms “hot” and “cold” to 
characterize the two analysis modes they described. Self-distanced 
analysis is not cold because it implies the emotion, but this 
emotion is looked at or described from the “outside.” Kross 
and Ayduk (2008) have suggested that instructions used in 
Watkins’ studies to elicit concrete and abstract rumination favor 
self-distanced and self-immersed analysis, respectively.
Only one study related the concepts of both programs (Rude 
et  al., 2011). This study stated that what PMT considers 
maladaptive rumination could not be characterized as an abstract 
rumination but as a negative assessment rumination. When 
comparing concrete rumination, evaluative abstract rumination, 
and non-evaluative abstract rumination (related to self-distancing 
reflection), the authors observed that the latter was the one 
that showed the most adaptive results.
DISCUSSION
Several researchers have shown a predominance of maladaptive 
effects of the reflection on negative emotional experiences (Mor 
and Winquist, 2002). In return, there is also strong evidence 
of the need and importance that reflecting on experienced 
negative emotions and events usually has (Greenberg and 
Pascual-Leone, 2006). This shows that the form and context 
of the reflective processes are determining factors of the type 
of effects that they produce. Negative emotional experiences 
stimulate the process of thoughts about them, and this probably 
occurs as part of self-regulation processes to search for solutions 
and processes to elaborate and integrate the experiences (Watkins, 
2008; Vine et al., 2014). This phenomenon implies that negative 
emotional experiences can “activate” at the same time adaptive 
and maladaptive forms of reflection, which can be interconnected.
The lines of research developed by Watkins and by Ayduk 
and Kross have been focused in trying to distinguish the aspects 
of the focusing forms of thinking in the negative emotional 
experiences that would make them more adaptive or maladaptive. 
Both show positive results, but they characterize the implied 
processes in different ways. This sets a question of interest: 
how can concrete rumination and self-distanced analysis have 
similar positive effects if they correspond to forms of reflection 
understood differently and, in some respects, as the opposite?
At least three explanatory lines can be  hypothesized. One 
possibility is that self-distancing reflection and concrete rumination 
avoid, through different ways, the tendency to use brooding and 
its detrimental effects. A second possibility is that both forms 
of processing allow an individual to block the negative effects 
of suppression and emotional avoidance and favor contact with 
maintained negative emotional states and the elaboration of their 
experiences. Notably, both programs obtained promising results 
in individuals with post-traumatic stress disorders, which supports 
this possibility (Sezibera et  al., 2009; Wisco et  al., 2015; Penner 
et al., 2016). A third possibility supposes that there would be more 
relation than it seems between concrete rumination and self-
distanced analysis. Focusing on the “how” of the experience, as 
proposed by PMT, could result in a process of self-distanced 
analysis, depending on how this focus is operationalized. Notably, 
the treatment received by the individuals in “concrete rumination” 
in Watkins’ studies could be  implying that individuals learn to 
analyze their experiences in a more distanced manner. Inversely, 
self-distanced analysis could be understood as a form of concrete 
rumination that allows the person to contact her/his emotional 
experiences, identifying specific aspects of the events that she/
he is living and enabling new possibilities of action.
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The study of these hypotheses requires differentiating the 
experiential component from the problem-solving component 
involved in “concrete rumination.” The experiential component 
is the most complex one since its effects seem to strongly depend 
on the way and context in which concrete rumination is made. 
In fact, from the SDT point of view, a detailed analysis of the 
emotional experience may favor self-immersion and it can have 
further detrimental consequences. The meta-analysis performed 
by Webb et  al. (2012) supports the idea that an experiential 
focus on negative events and emotions is maladaptive – although 
less than focusing on the analysis of meanings and consequences 
of the experience. However, it can be  hypothesized that, under 
certain circumstances, the experiential component may favor 
emotional approach and acceptance, and through this, having 
positive effects.
In this regard, notably, PMT and SDT state that there would 
be  a relation between the processing mode they consider 
adaptive and mindfulness. Mindfulness is a form of attention 
to the distanced experience, where, unlike the explicit proposal 
of PMT and SDT, the experience is left to flow, with no analysis 
or judgment (Kross and Ayduk, 2017). Emotional distancing 
through mindfulness has been related to the decrease of 
emotional exhaustion (Karing and Beelmann, 2019). Mindfulness 
decreases the tendency to the abstract negative appraisal of 
the past and allows positive reappraisal (Desrosiers et al., 2013). 
In depressive patients treated with mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy (MBCT), improvement is mediated by the increase in 
mindfulness and the decrease in maladaptive rumination (Shahar 
et  al., 2010). Cluster analysis has shown the mindfulness core 
processes (describing and nonreactivity to the experience) are 
specifically related to acceptance and reappraisal as emotional 
regulation strategies, with positive outcomes (Iani et  al., 2019).
Another possible relation between concrete rumination and 
self-distanced analysis is the easement of problem-solving. 
Problem-solving is explicitly stimulated in the training in concrete 
rumination. Self-distanced analysis also stimulates a broader 
view toward difficulties, which would allow to better identify 
the available solutions (Mori et  al., 2015; Barth et  al., 2016; 
Goldberg et  al., 2019).
From our point of view, these three explicative lines are not 
incompatible. We  think that self-distancing is at the basis of 
the effectiveness of concrete rumination. Also, self-distancing 
appears as a critical element to differentiate analysis forms focused 
in the causes and the meaning of the experiences that lead to 
brooding and intensify the discomfort of those that favor 
reappraisal and the integration of them in the narration and 
personal identity. However, we  do not agree that self-distanced 
analysis must be  always focused on the most global aspects 
and those aspects related to the meaning of the lived experiences. 
In certain contexts and moments, detailed approach to the 
experienced situations and emotional states can be  convenient 
and necessary. On the other hand, the theory of the processing 
mode would be enriched if it considered that, at certain moments 
and circumstances, the analysis of the why and the meaning 
of negative emotional experiences could be  a useful part of a 
reappraisal process of these.
Further researches are required to subject the stated hypotheses 
to test. A critical aspect is to determine how much self-distancing 
there is in concrete rumination and how much of concrete 
rumination there is in self-distanced analysis. It would be  of 
particular interest to compare the effects of a self-distanced 
experiential analysis to the effects of a self-distanced analysis of 
causes and meanings in different situations and in different 
temporalities after an experience. Another related aspect of interest 
is that SDT leads to a belief that every implication in the 
emotional experience in the first person is negative emotional 
immersion, and does not necessarily have to be like that. Whether 
every emotional immersion is necessarily negative is unclear. 
That depends on how it is performed as shown, in the therapeutic 
field, by techniques such as prolonged exposure and other therapies 
focused on emotion (Greenberg and Pascual-Leone, 2006; Zandberg 
et  al., 2017). Consequently, the identification of the temporal 
intrapersonal and interpersonal, and contextual factors that 
influence the reflection process is highly relevant.
In summary, PMT and SDT are research programs relevant 
to the identification of what is characteristic of the adaptive 
and maladaptive reflective processing of negative emotional 
experiences. A challenge is to better delimit the scope of their 
main approaches, to which the mutual contrast between them 
can contribute.
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